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5 Witchcraft, Justice, and Human Rights 
in Africa: Cases from Malawi 
 Adam  Ashforth 
 Abstract:  The human rights approach to witchcraft accusations denies their validity 
and forecloses the possibility of a trial, fair or otherwise. While there is much to be 
said for a bracing rationalism in all aspects of life, evidence from Africa over the past 
couple of centuries shows no sign that witchcraft narratives lose their plausibility as 
a result of people being told that witches do not exist. 
 Résumé:  L’exclusion des accusations de sorcellerie dans le contexte de la gestion des 
droits de l’homme annule leur réalité et exclut la possibilité de rendre justice en cas 
d’accusation infondée. Bien qu'il y ait beaucoup à dire pour soutenir un rationalisme 
solide dans tous les aspects de la vie, des études de cas menées au cours des deux 
derniers siècles en Afrique démontrent que les récits de sorcellerie n’ont rien perdu 
de leur crédibilité en dépit des discours publics niant l’existence des sorcières. 
 Keywords :  Human rights ;  witchcraft ;  justice ;  Malawi 
 After all, it is putting a very high price on one’s conjectures to have a 
man roasted alive because of them. 
 —Montaigne,  Of Cripples. 
 Introduction: New Language, Old Obsessions 
 International human rights activists have recently become interested in 
violence perpetrated against accused witches, in Africa and elsewhere. 
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The issue has received attention from, among others, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women ( 2002 ), the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings (UNHCR  2009 ), the U.N. High 
Commission on Refugees (Schnoebelen  2009 ; UNHCR  2004 ,  2009 , 
 2011 ), UNICEF (Cimpric  2010 ), and the European Parliament (Hanson & 
Ruggiero  2013 ), as well as NGOs such as Save the Children (Molinar  2006 ), 
HelpAge International ( 2011 ), and Stepping Stones (Foxcraft  2009 ). The 
latter NGO was founded by Gary Foxcroft, a young Englishman, specifically 
to address the plight of Nigerian children accused of witchcraft; Foxcroft 
has also been active in founding the Witchcraft and Human Rights 
Information Network ( www.whrin.org ). International conferences have 
been held to address violence against witches. Christian clergy have con-
vened committees.  1  Campaigns have been launched.  2  Money is being 
raised.  3  A novel has been published (Ormsby  2013 ). Law review papers 
proliferate (e.g., Ludsin  2003 ; Mgbako & Glenn  2011 ; Quarmyne  2011 ; 
Tebbe  2007 ). And documentaries have been made to raise awareness of the 
issue, such as  Saving Africa’s Witch Children about Foxcroft’s work in Nigeria 
(Gavan & van der Valk  2009 ) and  The Witches of Gambaga about a “witch 
camp” refuge for accused witches in northern Ghana (Badoe,  2010 ). 
 Lurid tales of grotesque violence serve as a rallying cry for the 
well-intentioned in their efforts to curb what they call “witchcraft violence” 
or “witchcraft abuse” (see Foxcroft  2009 ), or, more recently, with a view to 
a catchy acronym, “witchcraft accusation and persecution” or WAP (WHIRN 
 2013 ) as in this brochure advertising a two-day course in Oxford for lawyers 
working on asylum cases relating to witchcraft:
 Accusations of witchcraft are occurring today in communities around the 
globe. Startling accounts of torture, starvation, abandonment and death 
have been documented. Accused witches have been executed by hanging, 
burying alive, drowning and burning, with paraffin or petrol thrown at 
them to ignite the fire. Victims are often from vulnerable groups: the el-
derly, the disabled and increasingly over the past two decades, children. 
(UNHCR & Fahamu Trust  2012 ). 
 A video of a group of accused witches being burned to death, probably 
in Kenya, has been circulating on the Internet in recent years, having 
been viewed more than a half million times at the time of writing (see 
 www.liveleak.com/view?i=dae_1236854361 ). Refugee rights groups and 
asylum lawyers are also dealing with people, not only Africans, fleeing 
persecution as “witches” and seeking asylum in countries where witch-
craft is not high on the list of public concerns and generally not well 
understood.  4  
 In all these discussions, the issue of justice is presented as a matter 
that is so clear and unambiguous that it hardly needs to be raised: 
innocent people are being persecuted with “torture, starvation, aban-
donment, and death.” Worse still, the most affected are members of 
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“vulnerable groups,” particularly women, children, and the elderly (see 
Adinkrah  2004 ; Federici  2008 ; Mgbako & Glenn  2011 ; Quarmyne  2011 ; 
Secker  2013 ). As one outspoken activist put it, “Witchcraft in much of 
the developing world—Africa, India, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, Central 
and South America—is at the core a human rights issue because millions 
of people are victimized for bogus, non-rational, non-scientific reasons” 
(Norman Miller, quoted in Barber  2012 ). Something, surely, must be 
done. 
 Most Africans who worry about witchcraft, however—which is just 
about everyone at one time or another—see witchcraft as raising a very 
different issue of justice, one that goes beyond the simple problem of 
false accusation and involves harm done by witches to their victims. 
Perpetrators of witchcraft, from this perspective, are dangerous and 
powerful figures, not members of vulnerable groups, however frail-
seeming they may be. Witches are said to cause illness, death, suffering, 
and misfortunes of all kinds. They are, in essence, perpetrators of crim-
inal violence, albeit of a particular kind. For people who live in a world 
with witches, the dangers they pose are real and present. In such places 
the primary concern is security: how to protect against witchcraft and 
other forms of violence. A secondary issue is justice: what to do about 
perpetrators of harm when injury has been done. For people who live 
with the fear of witchcraft, the issue of justice in relation to witches is 
clear. Innocent people are being attacked, harmed, and killed. The 
question, then, is: how can the perpetrators best be identified, disarmed, 
and, if necessary, punished? Historically, this was a central problem 
facing political authorities. It remains so to this day. 
 The question I want to address in this article is: Can the rights 
of accused witches be protected while justice is done, and seen to be 
done, for their victims? That is, can there be justice for both accused 
witches and fearful communities in the era of human rights? Or, to put 
it in a slightly different form: Is it possible to protect the rights of an 
accused witch while still securing justice for a community that sees itself 
at risk of occult assault? A reading of the recent literature on the subject 
of “witchcraft violence” and human rights would suggest that the answer 
to these questions is a resounding  No. From this perspective, the crimes 
of witches are imaginary, so the question of justice for their victims is 
moot. 
 If it is indeed the case that it is impossible to protect the rights of 
accused witches while serving the ends of justice for a fearful community, 
then the outlook for protecting accused witches as well as promoting 
respect for human rights in Africa is dim. For the victims of putative witches 
far outnumber those accused of witchcraft, and there is no sign that the 
plausibility of witchcraft narratives is diminishing in contemporary Africa. 
In this article, however, I shall argue that the question of justice need not be 
dismissed out of hand; that while there is a regrettable amount of suffering 
imposed on suspected witches, there is far more work taking place in 
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everyday contexts as well as indigenous and formal judicial institutions that 
addresses the problem of witchcraft in ways that not only uphold justice 
and rights, but also resolve conflicts (see Kgatla et al.  2003 ; ter Haar  2007 ; 
Crampton,  2013 ). 
 An obsession with spectacular aspects of anti-witchcraft violence 
obscures attention to developments that are taking place around the 
continent in the management of spiritual insecurity by Africans them-
selves, notably in forms of enthusiastic religion and new forms of juris-
prudence of the sort Jean and John Comaroff ( 2004 ) call “organic 
African jurisprudence” (see also Fisiy  1998 ; Fisiy & Geschiere  1990 ; Fisiy 
& Rowlands  1990 ). In earlier work I wrote about the struggles of people 
accused of witchcraft in postapartheid Soweto, where there were no 
institutional forums for dealing with their problems. In one case my 
friend Madumo, accused of killing his mother with witchcraft, pursued 
a purely private resolution of his problem in the form of traditional 
healing to overcome what he saw as a “curse” (Ashforth  2000 ). In an-
other case a friend, having searched in vain for a forum wherein the 
conflict could be resolved, was hounded to death by an accuser (Ashforth 
 2005 ). I have also written of religious enthusiasm as a form of engage-
ment with powers deemed capable of overcoming spiritual insecurity 
(Ashforth  2011 ). Here I want to explore the question of justice in con-
temporary Malawi, where institutions dealing with cases of witchcraft do 
exist and are creating new forms of local jurisprudence to handle such 
accusations. 
 The key to this emergent jurisprudence is a shared commitment on the 
part of judicial authorities, in both formal and informal judicial forums, to 
the need for demonstrable evidence to sustain accusations of witchcraft 
and an insistence on a distinction between  being a witch and  performing 
witchcraft. This distinction echoes one that is operative in indigenous nar-
ratives of witchcraft and finds unexpected reinforcement in a judicial inter-
pretation of the colonial era Witchcraft Act (which is still in force). In terms 
of this distinction, being a witch is a matter of shame and suspicion, but not, 
in and of itself, a crime; causing injury and harm by occult means, however, 
is unambiguously criminal, though devilishly hard to prove. Insisting on 
proof in cases of witchcraft, as the English experience of witch trials in the 
seventeenth century shows (Shapiro  1991 ), amplifies doubt in ways that can 
be more protective of suspected witches than an insistence on the nonexis-
tence, and hence irrationality of believing in, witches and witchcraft. Or, to 
put it another way: epistemology trumps ontology when it comes to protecting 
African witches. 
 In terms of this emergent jurisprudence, the rights of a person accused 
of practicing witchcraft are the same as those of anyone accused of a crime: 
habeus corpus, fair trial, no cruel and unusual punishment, no torture, and 
so on. And, as the history of witch trials in England, as opposed to continen-
tal Europe, shows, without torture, confessions and thus convictions for 
witchcraft are hard to come by (Langbein  1977 ). Indeed, under the terms 
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of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Malawi Constitution, 
along with most other recent constitutions, the right of persons to identify 
themselves as witches, if they so desire, can be upheld in terms of the right 
to “freedom of belief”—even when such persons are widely despised.  5  
Further, the widespread commitment to the necessity of evidence in sup-
port of accusations of witchcraft and the requirement of proof “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” at least in the formal legal system, open avenues for re-
solving conflicts involving accusations of witchcraft through discourse and 
dialogue. 
 To be clear: I shall be arguing that current humanitarian efforts 
regarding violence against suspected witches in Africa are misplaced. I am 
not opposed to acts of kindness, by Africans or outsiders, in the protection 
of people suffering cruelty in whatever form. I also am not engaging in a 
critique of the universalism of human rights discourses (see Mutua  2002 ), 
though much of the recent writings on saving Africans accused of witch-
craft, especially the children, consist of veritable caricatures of the noto-
rious triad of victim, savage, and outsider hero. But I am suspicious of 
interventions such as campaigns or policy initiatives premised on a pre-
sumption of superior knowledge and wisdom in relation to matters of 
witchcraft. I would argue that violence against and mistreatment of sus-
pected witches reflect a failure of institutions of security and justice. So  if 
there is an increase in violence against suspected witches—as many human 
rights groups are asserting, albeit without any hard evidence—then it is 
unwise to advocate policies that further undermine the possibilities of col-
lective justice. And even more interesting than these issues is the question 
of how Africans are dealing with matters of security and justice relating to 
witchcraft in local communities. 
 Violence in a World of Witches and the New Anti-Anti-Witchcraft 
 The central feature of all talk of witchcraft, for those who fear the power of 
witches, is that it is a way for a person, or persons, to inflict harm on others. 
Witchcraft, in short, is a form of violence. Suppositions about matters of 
“witchcraft” have been found throughout all recorded human history and 
in virtually every place humans have been found, even if, in recent centuries, 
a section of the human community has prided itself, perhaps prematurely, 
on transcending the superstition and irrationality of talk of witchcraft.  6  Vast 
bodies of literature document varieties of witchcraft. Incalculable amounts 
of time have been invested in documenting putative “systems of belief” per-
taining to particular human collectivities and in attempting to describe and 
explain their peculiarities in relation to things like “social structure.” Much 
ink has also been spilled speculating about the connection between gender 
relations and witchcraft, seeking to explain why women predominate in the 
ranks of putative perpetrators. In all this talk and writing about witchcraft, 
however, one feature always recurs: speaking of “witchcraft” on the part of 
people who live in a world with witches, in all the varieties of terminology 
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that are used, is a way of construing injury as harm; that is, as a hurt delib-
erately inflicted on a victim, or victims, by a perpetrator or perpetrators. 
Witchcraft is a form of violence, albeit one perpetrated in secret with 
invisible—or, for want of a better word, occult—means. 
 For people who do not live in a world of witches, one of the most diffi-
cult issues to comprehend is the ontology of witchcraft as violence, as a 
variety of the multitudinous harms that humans are wont to inflict on one 
another. For such people witchcraft is a matter of “belief,” an issue pertain-
ing to the domain of the cognitive.  7  For people living in a world with 
witches, however, there is no essential ontological difference between the 
violence perpetrated by witches and the ordinary forms of violence perpe-
trated by physical means. Nor are they speaking metaphorically when refer-
ring to the violence perpetrated by witches. Witchcraft is also not merely an 
idiom through which other forms of conflict are expressed. The violence of 
witchcraft, for those who live in a world with witches, is every bit as real as 
any other form of violence; only the means and forms differ. In Africa, most 
Africans would agree, witchcraft is widespread. 
 Nevertheless, violence against witches, of the sort animating the cur-
rent surge of interest in human rights circles, is rare. Although fears and 
suspicions of occult assault are widespread, open accusations of witchcraft 
are the exception in most African communities; still more rare are actual 
assaults on suspected witches. A report by the Witchcraft Human Rights 
Information Network, an organization devoted to raising alarm about the 
issue, found “a minimum of 865 will have experienced violations of their 
human rights in 2013 due to belief in witchcraft and other malevolent 
beliefs” (WHIRN  2013 :3). Given the scale of misery on planet earth that 
year, these are not huge numbers. Anti-witchcraft violence, when it occurs, 
is mostly perpetrated by angry mobs, usually composed of young men (see, 
e.g., Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders 
 1996 ). Most people deplore such attacks, seeing them as evidence of a 
breakdown in social institutions that should protect communities both 
from the harms perpetrated by witches and the violence of the attackers. 
Violence against suspected witches is little different from other forms of 
vigilante vengeance; it flourishes in the absence of institutions serving 
justice (Taussig-Rubbo  2011 ). 
 Many human rights activists, inaccurately, call attacks on suspected 
witches “witchcraft violence,” “witchcraft abuse,” or “witchcraft-based 
violence,” and often lump it in, even more inaccurately, with acts of violence 
such as the notorious  muti murder phenomenon of South Africa, or attacks 
on albinos in Tanzania, where people are killed and body parts harvested 
for magical purposes (see Cohan  2011 ; Hund  2003 ).  8  Witchcraft violence, 
however, is violence perpetrated by witches. Violence against putative 
witches should properly be termed  anti -witchcraft violence. The humani-
tarian interest in this violence, then, should be described as “anti-anti-
witchcraft” violence, although I use the term somewhat sardonically, with a 
nod to Clifford Geertz ( 2000 ) and his stand on “anti-anti-relativism.” But I also 
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want to raise the logical question that the term suggests: does being anti-anti-
witchcraft mean being pro-witchcraft? I would suggest that it does—at least 
when viewed from the perspective of people living in a world with witches. 
 While anti-witchcraft violence is rare, the violence perpetrated by pur-
ported witches is common. In a 2012 study of “witchcraft-based violence” in 
Malawi conducted by the Association of Secular Humanists (ASH) and 
funded by the Norwegian Embassy, Charles Chilimampunga, a sociologist 
from Chancellor College, and George Thindwa, executive secretary of 
ASH, found that out of a sample of ninety-four “key informant” inter-
viewees, ten had considered themselves victims of witchcraft attacks in the 
past two years. Of these, seven claimed to know the identity of the attacking 
witch, although only one directly confronted the assailant. Most victims and 
their families sought help from healers and pastors—of whom there are 
countless thousands in Malawi, as elsewhere in Africa, offering services of 
healing and protection. Of the witches who were openly accused—and 
the researchers found only fifteen in their sample of 638 households 
surveyed—eleven (73%) reported being subjected to some sort of “abuse” 
(Chilimampunga & Thindwa  2012 :61). 
 Although the ASH study did not draw on a random sample of the 
national population, the proportion of injury to insult among people who 
claim to have been bewitched is instructive. Remember: for every ten per-
sons who found themselves injured by witches, only one took direct action 
against the suspected witch. By this reckoning, then, the problem of violence  by 
witches is more than ten times greater than the problem of violence  against 
witches—unless, of course, you believe the putative victims of witchcraft are 
merely imagining the harms they say they have suffered. 
 Most communities in Malawi, as elsewhere in Africa, manage most of 
the time to contain suspicions of witchcraft and deflect assaults on witches. 
Although the dangers and damages of witchcraft are deemed material, 
most people deplore violence. When well-respected figures are able to 
speak with authority in a community, it is usually possible to prevent mob 
justice from flaring up against suspected witches (van Beek  2007 ). Moreover, 
despite seeming “vulnerable” to outsiders, witches are feared for their 
power to cause harm, so it is usually prudent to protect against them rather 
than seek to punish them. Indeed, it is not always a bad thing to be thought 
a member of a group with extraordinary powers—especially, perhaps, for 
the otherwise vulnerable.  9  Chilimampunga and Thindwa, for example, 
quote a man who felt himself to be a victim of witchcraft but was advised to 
do nothing against the perpetrator “because of fear of what might happen 
next to him” (2012:61). Most of the retaliation against witches takes place 
through the mediums of traditional healing, whereby healers promise to 
deflect the damaging forces back onto the perpetrator, and of gossip, which 
undermines reputations. 
 Many communities, however, do not have authority figures capable of 
resolving issues of witchcraft when accusations surface. Many are riven by 
conflicts between competing authorities, leaving victims of witchcraft in 
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confusion about where to turn for help and a sense that their only hope is 
to take matters of justice into their own hands. Sometimes political and 
religious leaders have a direct interest in fomenting conflict and hostility. 
Witch hunts do happen. Chilimampunga and Thindwa estimate that in 
Malawi, a country of about 16 million, violent witch hunts took place about 
once a week in 2011, the year preceding their study.  10  Sometimes anti-
witchcraft movements can sweep whole regions, causing large-scale damage 
and disruption, as in the Northern Transvaal region of South Africa in the 
1980s when, by some estimates, several hundred suspected witches were 
killed by youthful vigilantes in the context of the struggle against apartheid 
(Ralushai  1996 ; Ritchken  1988 ). 
 There are no reliable statistics concerning the prevalence of witch 
killing in Africa and few explanations for the variations that occur across 
time and place. One of the more systematic studies, by the economist 
Edward Miguel ( 2005 ), found that a woman over the age of fifty in the 
Sukumaland region of Tanzania, the area with the highest levels of witch 
killings in that country, had a one in five hundred chance of being killed in 
a given year.  11  Nonetheless, it is important to remember that violence 
against witches is the exception rather than the norm. Every community 
knows its witches, and they are mostly left unmolested. Knowledge of who 
they are circulates within communities in the form of rumor and gossip 
(Ashforth  2005 ; Stewart & Strathern  2004 ). The woman everyone knew as 
the witch in the neighborhood where I used to live in Soweto, for example, 
lived peacefully with her family and died of old age in her nineties. Being a 
witch, it seems, is one thing. But doing the things witches do—such as 
killing innocent victims or teaching the trade to children—is another. 
 Why Malawi? 
 Malawi is a good place to examine issues of justice and witchcraft. It is a 
peaceful and relatively stable, if very poor, democracy since the founding 
president, the old-school African dictator Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was 
ousted in 1994 in a surge of democratic sentiment catalyzed by an encyc-
lical letter from Catholic bishops (see McCracken  1998 ). It has a court 
system that is reasonably functional, at least in urban areas, and unlike in 
South Africa, where the courts are still dominated by the descendants 
of white settlers, its courts are thoroughly Africanized. According to the 
National Victimization Survey of 2004, the justice system also enjoys a high 
degree of legitimacy in the public’s eyes (Kanyongolo  2006 ). 
 After independence President Banda retained the colonial legal system 
founded on English Common and Statute Law. The law continues today 
to be shaped by English procedures, practices, and precedents, albeit in 
an African context where the so-called Traditional Authorities (TAs) also 
hold sway in local affairs and exercise considerable juridical authority (see 
Cammack, Kanyongolo, & O’Neil  2009 ; Kapindu  2009 ). Principles of 
customary law occasionally intrude into the formal courtrooms, particularly 
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at the lowest levels. Despite recent efforts at restructuring the court system 
to formalize the relationship between customary jurisdictions and the 
formal system, a great deal of confusion remains (Kaunda  2011 ). 
 During the reign of President Banda (from 1964 to 1994), a system of 
Traditional Courts with jurisdiction over both customary and criminal cases 
was established in parallel with the formal courts. These courts, which were 
notorious for being used by the regime to punish political dissidents, were 
disbanded in 1994, leaving customary cases in the hands of informal chiefs’ 
courts. Chiefs’ courts mostly handle family disputes and land issues, along 
with most of the other disturbances of peaceful life in the roughly twenty-
four thousand villages in the country (Schärf et al.  2002 ). Land disputes, it 
should be mentioned, are becoming more intense and more common in 
this densely populated country, often exacerbating claims of witchcraft in 
the process (Peters  2002 ). In 2011, in an effort to better coordinate rela-
tions between the domains of customary and formal law, the government 
introduced legislation to establish Local Courts, once again with criminal as 
well as customary jurisdiction (Kaunda  2011 ). Implementation of this legis-
lation, however, has been slow, and the two main domains of law remain the 
chief’s court under the tree, and the Magistrate’s Court in the town. 
 Malawi has been the subject of some classic writings on the issues of law 
and custom in Africa (e.g., Chanock  1985 ), which provide the historical per-
spective to the cases discussed here. It is also the scene of an ongoing project 
being implemented by the ASH and generously funded by the Norwegian 
government to protect the rights of witches by “sensitizing” various author-
ities, such as magistrates, police, and traditional leaders, to the prohibitions 
against anti-witchcraft activities contained in the colonial-era Witchcraft Act. 
In other words, the ASH has given its support to an approach that is diamet-
rically opposed to the one that I advocate here. Convinced that witchcraft 
does not exist, and intent on protecting the rights of the accused, its project 
seeks to make it impossible for any institution in the country to respond to the 
desire for justice among people who feel themselves victims of witchcraft. 
I would advocate an approach that respects the desires of communities for 
justice and security in relation to witchcraft while strengthening the com-
mitment to evidence among those called on to adjudicate cases. 
 Before we address the implications of these new forms of anti-anti-
witchcraft activism, let us examine some contemporary witchcraft trials 
from Malawi’s courts. My cases are drawn from the records of proceedings 
in the Balaka Magistrate’s Court.  12  
 Two Recent Witchcraft Cases 
 The Case of the Kasitos 
 In June 2009 Magistrate First Grade Damson Banda presided over a crim-
inal witchcraft trial in the Balaka Magistrate’s Court. I was able to obtain 
a copy of the written judgment in the case and later interviewed the 
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magistrate (June 26, 2013) about his approach to these matters. Balaka is a 
small market town in the south-central region of Malawi. The case arose 
when a man named Masautso Kasito accused his father, Bartret, his sister, 
Annie, and her son Shybu of teaching witchcraft to young children in the 
family. 
 Of all the witchcraft narratives current in Malawi in recent years, 
none are more horrifying than those telling of the teaching of witchcraft 
to children. For, on top of all the ordinary abuse—physical, sexual, 
psychological—that parents anywhere might imagine their child exposed 
to in the ordinary nightmares of life, children suffering under the infer-
nal pedagogy of witchcraft are turned into serial killing cannibals, 
addicted to preying upon their own kin. This they will do until they 
themselves are killed. Malawians, understandably, take this matter very 
seriously. 
 At the time that these cases were heard, Malawi had for two decades 
been suffering under a severe burden from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Some 
fifty thousand people a year were dying, leaving behind seven hundred 
thousand orphans (UNAIDS,  2013 ). While these narratives of children 
being taught witchcraft in order to cannibalize kin cannot be reduced to a 
mere idiom for speaking about AIDS, they do, however, serve to catalyze 
anxieties about the possible role of children in the deaths of parents and 
other kin. Whatever else is in play when people tell stories of children being 
taught witchcraft—and there is much—a simple fact underpins the con-
text: as a result of AIDS, there is a huge increase in the amount of death 
needing narration (Ashforth & Watkins,  2015 ). 
 In the case mentioned above, Masautso Kasito claimed, on the 
strength of a consultation with an “herbalist”—by which he meant a 
diviner, or  sing’anga , in Chichewa—that the witches in his family, as well 
as teaching children witchcraft, had killed his brother Fabiano with a 
magic hammer and were planning to attack him with the same weapon. 
The police brought charges against the three accused, and three young 
children, aged between five and seven, gave evidence accusing their 
teachers. Magistrate Banda heard the prosecution’s evidence, decided 
there was a legitimate complaint, heard the testimony of the defendants, 
and passed judgment. 
 In the text of the judgment read in court, the magistrate explained the 
legal issues in question. He reminded the court “that the accused persons 
are appearing before this court charged under Section 6 of the Witchcraft 
Act CAP 7:02 of the Laws of Malawi.” He then proceeded to read Section 6: 
“Any person who by his statements or actions represents himself/herself to 
be a wizard/witch or as having or exercising the power of witchcraft shall be 
liable for a fine of 50 pounds and to imprisonment for 10 years.” Next fol-
lowed an observation that the magistrate is fond of repeating in relation to 
witchcraft cases: “The section penalizes any pretences to witchcraft, while 
the whole Act ironically does not recognize the practice of witchcraft.” In 
this case, however, the irony in Section 6 was compounded by the apparent 
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foolishness of the police and the prosecution, which “charged the three 
accused persons with actual[ly] practicing witchcraft[,] a thing which all of 
them are denying in totality.” In other words, the State charged the three 
defendants with committing acts that were not criminal according to statu-
tory law, which did not recognize the reality of witchcraft; but if the defend-
ents had pleaded guilty to the nonexistent crime, they would have 
committed a real crime by representing themselves as having the power of 
witchcraft, which is contrary to Section 6. 
 At this point in the proceedings, a less sagacious judge would have 
declared the case closed, ordered the mistaken charges withdrawn, and 
sent everyone home. Reading the text of his judgment in this case, I could 
not help wondering why a busy magistrate would bother sitting through 
hours of confusing testimony and laboriously writing down every word 
when he knew, in point of law, that there was no case to be answered. 
Magistrate Banda, however, is wise to the duties of his office. The police 
may have made a mistake in formulating the charge, but despite that detail, 
along with the fact that witchcraft is not illegal, he knew perfectly well when 
he took the case that he would in fact be conducting a witch trial. And he 
knew that a refusal to hear the case would have left everyone dissatisfied—
not only Kasito and the accused, but also the citizens of Balaka at large. Trust 
in the authority of his court and his office would have been undermined. 
 Magistrate Banda knows well what is at stake in these sorts of cases. 
When we met in 2013, the magistrate took pains to explain to me that some 
things that happen can in fact be explained only by witchcraft. “I know 
about these things,” he said. “I live in the community.” He told me a story 
from his youth. One night when he was out harvesting white ants from their 
mound, he saw a ball of fire that rose up above the height of the trees. “I said 
[to my friends], there are wizards there,” he told me, although they still 
wanted to harvest the ants. “These things really happen, he said. They 
cannot be explained.” 
 So, rather than shutting down proceedings by noting the police’s mis-
take, the wise magistrate heard the case in full. Well aware of the limits of 
the law, he took upon himself the responsibility of assessing the evidence of 
actual witchcraft as well as the evidence for possible infringement of the 
law. Despite the fact that the three accused denied “in totality” the charge 
of practicing witchcraft, they might still have been guilty of pretending to 
the powers thereof outside the courtroom, in contravention of Section 6 of 
the Witchcraft Act. Or, while technically innocent of infractions of the law, 
they might still be witches and thus pose the sort of danger to society that a 
magistrate is duty bound to forestall. They might even be guilty of practicing 
witchcraft, in this case teaching children the trade, while yet being safe 
from conviction by virtue of their refusal to confess. “Sometimes a case may 
fail because of a technicality,” he told me during our interview, “and people 
will be very upset. Sometimes, you know things are happening but you have 
to dismiss the case on a technicality”—the technicality being that there is no 
proof of the accused having pretended to possess the powers of witchcraft. 
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He understands these issues and how people feel about them, he told me, 
and his job was to make sure that conflicts were resolved within the frame-
work of the law, without people taking the law into their own hands and 
committing crimes against suspected witches. 
 The prosecution’s case in relation to the Kasitos was based on the evi-
dence provided by three children who “told this court they were taught the 
trade of practicing witchcraft by the accused themselves and that they have 
over the period been flying out to Mponda graveyard, uncovering grave pits 
and then eating human flesh at the instruction of the accused in the dock, 
and that the late Fabiano Kasito was actually hit by a magic hammer by 
the third accused person [Masautso Kasito’s nephew, Shybu] at about 
13:00 hours. . . . However, in defence,” wrote Magistrate Banda, “the 
accused have said that . . . Fabiano Kasito was a sick man and had been told 
never to be drinking beers by the medical authorities, but that he did not 
take heed of that advice and that his death should be attributed to noncom-
pliance with the advice.” 
 If there was any doubt that the magistrate did not consider the youth 
Shybu a witch or guilty of witchcraft, he later repeated that there was no 
evidence that Shybu killed his uncle with a hammer. If there was, he told 
the prosecutor, a charge of murder should have been brought. This was a 
central point: the crime alleged was  murder ; witchcraft was merely the 
means. Proving murder by witchcraft demands the same standard of evi-
dence as proving it when perpetrated by any other means—by a material 
hammer, for example. Since Shybu was not charged with murder, talk of 
the magic hammer was irrelevant. The sole legally relevant fact was whether 
or not Shybu had participated in teaching the children witchcraft—which 
would be a crime, since it would be tantamount to pretending to possess 
the powers of a witch. However, while the hammer issue was legally irrele-
vant, there was an important substantive issue that the magistrate also 
needed to address: Was Shybu a witch? In this regard, the implausibility of 
the story about his alcoholic uncle dying from causes other than beer 
undermined the credibility of assertions that the young man was a witch. 
 In relation to the first and second accused, Magistrate Banda rehearsed 
at greater length the evidence that they might be witches. He noted that 
Masautso Kasito’s father, Bartret, had had many accusations made against 
him and had been taken before village headmen. The central plank of the 
old man’s defense in this trial—which, as we shall see, might or might not 
have been proof of his innocence—was that after hearings in the Village 
Headman’s Court and the Group Village Headman’s Court he had been 
“made to drink some  mankhwala [medicine],” a poison ordeal from which 
he had survived.  13  But despite his denials, the magistrate noted, even his 
children were unsure about Mr. Kasito. His son Humphrey testified that “he 
has the belief that his father is a wizard because of the many rumours which 
have been made against him.” Magistrate Banda did not state categorically 
that he considered the old man to be a witch, nor did he state that he was 
 not a witch. He did, however, note that throughout all his trials and ordeals 
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the old man had denied charges of witchcraft. These denials precluded 
conviction under Section 6 of the Witchcraft Act. But the ambiguity in the 
magistrate’s judgment seemed to be deliberate. The old man might not be 
guilty as charged, but he might be a witch nonetheless. 
 Regarding Annie, Bartret Kasito’s daughter, the magistrate noted that 
when she was accused of witchcraft (after her brother Fabiano died) she 
was taken to the herbalist, where it was discovered that rather than being a 
witch, she had been a victim herself, and that “the head of her little child is 
used as a ball in the night by people who practice witchcraft.” To which 
Magistrate Banda added, showing how seriously he was taking this matter, 
“The unfortunate part of it is that this court was not told as to [who] are 
said to be doing that.” Anyone attending closely to proceedings would know 
at this point that Annie, along with her son, had been judged not guilty of 
witchcraft, as the magistrate subtly endorsed the divinations of the healers. 
Moreover, he pointed out, another witness confirmed her accounts of con-
sultations with healers, while no one could corroborate the children’s 
stories of being taught witchcraft. In the course of her testimony, it also 
emerged that Annie had been severely beaten by her nephews, Fabiano’s 
sons, after their father’s death. Although this fact had no bearing on the 
case, given the ruling on the cause of her brother’s death, it suggested that 
the magistrate thought she was prone to being targeted unfairly within the 
family. 
 Having signaled his opinions regarding the substantive issue at hand, 
Magistrate Banda returned to the question of law:
 If this court were to believe that the story by the prosecution as per the 
evidence given by the three children witnesses, that the three accused per-
sons have been teaching them witchcraft practices, and then that the third 
accused is the person who using a magic hammer hit and killed the late 
Fabiano Kasito, that would amount to this Court agreeing with the issue 
that there is witchcraft in our midst out of customary or traditional belief 
and not covered by the law under which the accused persons have been 
charged. 
 That there was in fact “witchcraft in our midst” was doubted neither by the 
magistrate nor the people in his court witnessing his judgment. But unlike 
traditional or customary authorities, statutory law and the rules of evidence 
tied the magistrate’s hands. With each judgment in cases such as these, 
Magistrate Banda delivers a lecture on epistemology, the key lesson of 
which is that mere rumors or customary “belief” is not proof. While stories 
might alert people as to the identity of a witch, and thus the need for pro-
tection from future harm, they do not satisfy the demands of evidence 
required for punishment of a crime. 
 In his judgment of the Kasito case, Magistrate Banda did not elaborate 
on the legal reasoning he followed in making his decision to proceed 
with hearing the case, despite the fact that the charges as listed were 
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inappropriate; he merely stated that “the Prosecution closed their case and 
then this court made a ruling of a case to answer on the charge leveled 
against them.” In other instances, however, Magistrate Banda has elabo-
rated on these standards. The standard of proof for a ruling that a case is 
legitimate is so-called prima facie evidence. In the words of “Lord Parker of 
England,” which the magistrate quoted from  A Guide to the Magistrates in 
Malawi , the prima facie standard means that “a reasonable tribunal, prop-
erly directing its mind to the law and evidence[,] could convict if no expla-
nation is offered by the defence.”  14  Magistrate Banda judged that the 
stories told by the children about being taught witchcraft were, in principle, 
credible. This did not require ruling on the substance of their particular 
claims of flying through the night in witchcraft airplanes to eat human flesh 
in graveyards under the tutelage of their three relatives. Those would have 
to be judged according to the evidence. But, like most Malawians who worry 
about witchcraft, Magistrate Banda was convinced of the possibility of strange 
happenings of these sorts. The underlying epistemological condition 
grounding such stories’ plausibility, it seems to me, is a blurring of the onto-
logical boundaries between dreaming and waking states, such that actions 
taking place in dreams are taken as possibly having real effects in the ordi-
nary waking world. 
 The key issue at law, however, was whether or not the adults were actu-
ally teaching the children, regardless of the content of those teachings, 
since, if they were, they would have been representing themselves as having 
the powers of witchcraft. From the point of view of the drafters of the legis-
lation and its antecedent, the English Witchcraft Act of 1736, penalizing 
such representations was justified in terms of the prevention of fraud. 
(Indeed, when the 1736 Act was finally repealed in 1945 it was replaced 
with the Fraudulent Mediums Act.) Magistrate Banda, however, used the 
possibility of conviction under Section 6 of the Witchcraft Act as a way of 
addressing a widely feared source of harm justifying severe punishment, 
the transforming of innocent children into evil witches. 
 In the course of passing judgment, the magistrate explained that in 
cases charged under Section 6, guilt can be proven by statements or actions 
in which the offender represents himself “to be a wizard or a witch,” as 
“having the power of witchcraft,” or as “having the power of exercising 
witchcraft.”  15  At no time, he told the court, did any of the accused persons 
claim to be a witch or represent himself or herself as having the power of 
witchcraft, either directly to the court or elsewhere. Nor was evidence 
presented of actions demonstrating the same, other than the stories of the 
young children—only one of whom was permitted to testify under oath. 
Here is where the question of Bartret Kasito’s poison ordeal became impor-
tant. If Bartret Kasito had represented his drinking of  mankhwala as a 
cleansing procedure, he might in theory have been found guilty by virtue 
of actions representing himself as a wizard, albeit a repentant one.  16  But, 
as the magistrate pointed out, “he has . . . been taken before the Village 
Headman and to the herbalists to be cleansed of a thing he denies to be 
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and that has been done on him but he has survived the test.” Under the 
provisions of the law, then, all three of the accused persons would have to 
be found innocent since they failed to confess. 
 In principle, evidence that a person had been involved in teaching 
witchcraft to children could satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Section 6, 
since who but a self-proclaimed witch could teach witchcraft? For this rea-
son, Magistrate Banda ruled that the prosecution had proved a prima facie 
case for the defense to answer. The problem for the prosecution, however, 
was that two of their three witnesses were ruled ineligible to give testimony 
under oath by virtue of their young ages, and the testimony of the single 
sworn witness had not been corroborated by independent witnesses. In 
explaining his reasoning for excluding the younger children Magistrate 
Banda cited a recent ruling in an appeal against a witchcraft conviction by 
Judge Chipeta of the High Court, who wrote that even if children testify 
under oath “the evidence of such witnesses would require corroboration.”  17  
Therefore, what the court was left with were allegations and rumors, which 
would not suffice to convict someone: “A belief alone [, regardless of] how 
strong it may be[,] is not evidence that an individual is guilty of an offence; 
there must be proof to whatever is alleged to be done or having been done.” 
For justice to be done in a court of law, therefore, either the witch must 
confess or proof must be presented. 
 One possible source of what the magistrate termed “independent evi-
dence” could have been the testimony of a sing’anga. In another witchcraft 
case tried in the same court three months later the central witnesses were 
two teenaged girls, one of whom claimed to be currently practicing witch-
craft with the accused “teacher,” having been taught the trade as a baby. 
Magistrate Banda noted that the accusers had consulted a sing’anga but 
“unfortunately the state did not bring forth the sing’anga in question.” He 
ruled, therefore, that the case could not proceed, and also warned the 
witnesses that they were liable of an offense under Section 4 of the Witchcraft 
Act, which outlaws accusing a person of witchcraft.  18  
 It is likely that Magistrate Banda, like the police, the Kasito family, and 
most of the other Balaka residents who heard about the case, found the 
testimony of the children credible. The magistrate was clearly of the opin-
ion that while Annie and Shybu were not witches, the old man probably 
was, noting at one point that Bartret Kasito had “boasted that he has never 
been caught at anybody’s house practicing witchcraft”—a choice of words 
that itself suggests that the magistrate believed the accused was lying. But 
convicting people under the Witchcraft Act imposes strict requirements for 
evidence: “People believe that he is a wizard,” he said, “but to prove the 
point is a problem since he denies to be such.” Before pronouncing the 
final verdict he addressed the Kasito family, passing what might be called an 
informal sentence on the father. Clearly speaking for himself rather than as 
the spokesman for “this Court,” he said, “It is my view that his own children 
should make arrangements to have him settled at his home district in 
Zomba other than here in Balaka where there have been too many stories 
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against him.” (In the 2013 interview at his office in the court, the magistrate 
described his intention in speaking to the Kasito family in this way as giving 
“advice”) In much the same way a chief might impose a sentence of banish-
ment on a witch spared the death penalty. 
 Finally, the magistrate pronounced judgment:
 This Court has found as a fact that the prima case the Prosecution had 
established against the accused in the dock has been outweighed by the 
evidence in defence, and this is also per the law now in place which ironi-
cally does not recognize the existence of witchcraft. 
 The Case of Mrs. K. 
 On the June, 5, 2009, Malawi’s premier newspaper,  The Nation , published a 
front-page story under a banner headline:
 Witchcraft Terrorises Balaka Hospital 
 by Nation Reporter 
 Witchcraft has terrorised Balaka District Hospital, forcing medical staff to 
petition the Ministry of Health to transfer a nurse suspected of teaching 
the art to children at the campus and trying to kill some members of staff. 
 One nurse, who was a victim in the latest ordeal last Sunday, was 
rushed to her home in Chikwawa by hospital management fearing for her 
life and her sister’s children who were staying with her at the hospital. 
 The two children revealed that . . . [another] nurse had taught them 
witchcraft and ordered them to kill their aunt. 
 Balaka Hospital administrator Symon Nkhoma confirmed on 
Wednesday the district health management team wrote the Ministry of 
Health on June 2, 2009, giving it a 48-hour ultimatum to solve the situation 
or risk a strike or exodus of the staff. 
 Nkhoma said one nurse is alleged to be teaching children witchcraft 
and trying to kill a nurse, medical assistant and lab technician. He said the 
children revealed the nurse for the first time in April and management 
advised staff to love one another and pray. 
 “We fear we may lose staff, hence writing the ministry” said Nkhoma, 
who added that the ministry told them that the South East Zone of the 
ministry would look into the matter. 
 The nurse . . . also confirmed . . . that another nurse at the hospital 
taught her sister’s children witchcraft and that she wanted to kill her. 
( The Nation Reporter 2009) 
 Rumors about witchcraft at Balaka Hospital were also broadcast on the 
popular national radio call-in program  Nkhani Zam’maboma (News from the 
Districts).  19  
 So began the ordeal of Mrs. K., who sought for many months for a place 
to find justice, to clear her name, and to find what she called, when 
I interviewed her after the proceedings, “a fair forum where the issue could 
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be settled.” Among other actions she sued her colleagues Rennie Chikaoneka 
and Promise Kachale for defamation of character: “Kundiyipitsira mbiri 
ponena kuti ndine mfiti” (Defaming my character by saying that I am a 
witch). Magistrate First Grade Damson Banda heard this case as well, on 
July 1, about a month after the Kasito case. 
 Although Mrs. K.’s case was technically a civil suit for defamation, 
everyone in Balaka referred to it as a “witch trial” in which Mrs. K. was the 
defendant. In her conduct throughout the trial, Mrs. K. made it clear that 
she saw it that way, too. Mrs. K. knew that she was innocent. Like everyone 
else, as she made clear in the trial, she had no doubt that these children 
had been taught the infernal trade of witchcraft, but she knew who had 
perpetrated it: not herself, but rather the mother of one of her accusers. 
Her defense, in other words, was to accuse another. 
 After her hearing, however—in which she presented a long, convo-
luted story that painted her not as the practitioner of witchcraft but as its 
victim—it was clear that she had signally failed to vindicate herself. Part of 
the reason for this was sociological: Mrs. K. did not make a very good victim 
figure. She was powerful in the workplace and comparatively wealthy in her 
community. She was also disliked; her colleagues found her proud, and she 
was even described as “cruel” in the local gossip at the time. But a more funda-
mental problem faced Mrs. K., as it faces everyone suspected or accused of 
being a witch. If it is difficult to prove the guilt of a suspected witch, it is 
virtually impossible for an accused witch to prove her innocence, since the 
general presumption is that such a proclamation is always a lie. Indeed, the 
more she protests, the more her guilt is assumed. Ironically, the only sure 
way to escape the burden of suspicion of witchcraft is to confess to being 
a witch and to submit to a cleansing process in the hope of forgiveness. 
Sometimes, a witch whose work has been detected before it has been 
completed—such as when the victim is seriously sick but not yet dead—will 
be put on a kind of probation, charged with removing the curse and allow-
ing the victim to recover on pain of further punishment if the victim dies. 
The ultimate punishment for a witch is death or banishment from the com-
munity, though the more usual fate is social death. 
 In the case of Mrs. K., nobody disputed the fact that the two defendants 
had been the source of the allegations of witchcraft that had been brought 
to the hospital authorities, their workmates, and the wider public and that 
had tarnished Mrs. K’s reputation. On the witness stand, the two young 
nurses made no secret of the fact that they believed Mrs. K. was a witch. 
Promise Kachale told the court that she believed Mrs. K. was responsible for 
afflicting her with body pains and that she was lurking around her house in 
the form of a black cat. The testimony placed Magistrate Banda in a diffi-
cult position. If he were to rule in Mrs. K.’s favor and find the defendants 
guilty of defamation, virtually everyone in Balaka—not to mention the 
wider readership of the  Nation and the audience of  Nkhani Zam’maboma —
would have seen him as the protector of a dangerous witch. His court would 
lose credibility. However, as an officer of the law in a country where the law 
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does not recognize the reality of witchcraft, he had to be careful in framing 
his judgment. 
 Magistrate Banda gave two brief lectures on the laws of Malawi while 
passing judgment in Mrs. K.’s trial. The first was an excursus on the laws 
pertaining to libel and slander; the second, as in the Kasito case, was an 
explanation of the criminal provisions of the Witchcraft Act. Despite pro-
testing at several points in his judgment that the substantive issue before the 
court was not witchcraft, the magistrate again quoted Section 6 stipulating 
that a witch, under the law, is any person who represents himself or herself 
as such. He then explained that for a person to be found guilty under 
Section 6, “it must be proved that the person has confessed.” But this was 
not the case here, and, besides, this was a civil case of defamation, not a 
criminal trial under the Witchcraft Act. Even if Mrs. K. might turn out to be 
a witch, she was not the accused party in this trial. 
 As in the Kasito case, Magistrate Banda, had he wished to, could have 
shut this whole case down at the start. He could have drawn on the prece-
dent of Civil Cause No. 547 of 2006 in the High Court of Malawi, a similar 
case in which Assistant Registrar T. R. Ligwe overturned a lower court’s 
ruling of defamation. The judge in that case argued that for slander to be 
actionable it must impute a criminal offense or “general charge of crimi-
nality.” Since, under the Witchcraft Act, being a witch (as opposed to claim-
ing to be a witch) is not a crime, calling someone a witch (as opposed to 
claiming evidence of witchcraft practices, as in the Kasito case) cannot be 
defamatory. But the magistrate knew that the case before him was, at least 
de facto, a witch trial and that the community was expecting him to rule on 
whether or not Mrs. K. was a witch. Since the trials of Mrs. K. had become 
the focus of national media attention, he was perhaps also speaking to a 
larger audience than that of his courtroom, particularly since at the time of 
the case the Witchcraft Act was under review by the Malawi Law Commission. 
He also couldn’t have failed to notice my white face in the back of the 
room, perhaps thinking I was a foreign journalist. Following his explana-
tion of the necessity of confession, Magistrate Banda launched into the 
following disquisition on witchcraft.
 In this case I am of the view that owing to the many issues which are being 
talked about and allegedly experienced out there, certain things have got 
to be done if we are to forge ahead as a country and in particular to issues 
about witchcraft. We should not pretend that the practice does not exist; 
rather Malawi as a country should come up with an enabling law to sort out 
the problem. I think that there are things we can do as a country: 
 (1) Acknowledge the existence and wide spread use of witchcraft and 
traditional medicine; 
 (2) Be open about it and not be ashamed of it; and . . . 
 (3) Try to bring modernity in the use of this traditional medicine . . . 
[rather than] using it to kill or bewitch others . . . . [We should] engage the 
witchcraft experts and asing’anga and let them know that they can be 
useful to the country if they did their stuff in a way to help the country. 
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 After his long, and in the case of this particular trial legally irrelevant, 
discussion of the law on witchcraft in Malawi, he finally stated, “This Court 
would like to put it on record that the issue whether the plaintiff is a witch 
or does practice witchcraft is not what is before this Court and as such I am 
not going to decide on an issue which has not been complained of.” He 
then proceeded to express his judgment in a manner that was legally 
flawless—in terms of the issues in the case—but also suggestive enough to 
leave open the conclusion that Mrs. K. was indeed a witch.
 In case of defamation it must be proved that the statement made by the 
defendant(s) against or about the plaintiff is false and that the defen-
dants[,] despite being aware that there is no truth in it[,] went ahead in 
publicizing such kind of information to other people or the world at large. 
In the same vein the issue as to whether the plaintiff is not a witch is not 
what is before this court of law, because there is no evidence which has 
been tendered . . . to show that the plaintiff is or is not a witch. Only if 
it had been proved that the plaintiff is not a witch or does not practice 
witchcraft . . . [would] the two defendants have been found liable to the 
claim as lodged by the plaintiff. 
 The judgment continued:
 For this issue [of whether or not Mrs. K. was a witch who was teaching 
the witchcraft to children] to be put to rest[,] I do believe . . . that the 
children . . . should have been the people to explain it all for they know 
something about the issues. It is therefore the considered view of this 
Court that the matter here has lost direction because the two defendants 
[i.e., Rennie Chikaoneka and Promise Kachale] are people who heard 
[about the witchcraft] from other people . . . complaining about what is 
alleged to [have been] done by them in the company of some people[,] 
 probably including the plaintiff in this case . [Emphasis added] 
 In other words, Mrs. K probably was indeed a witch, but she was not charged 
as such and no evidence was presented. The magistrate then proceeded to 
dismiss Mrs. K.’s defense that she couldn’t be the witch since she had lived 
in Balaka a long time and no one had ever accused her of this. “That is not 
evidence,” he stated. 
 Magistrate Banda thus used his position on the bench to issue an infor-
mal judgment on the issue that was not, in point of law, the case before the 
court, but the one that was certainly the case in everyone’s mind: that Mrs. K. 
probably was a witch, and probably was teaching the children, but the case 
was not proved. His formal verdict on the legal case under consideration was 
that the defamation case failed because the plaintiff had not proved that she 
was not a witch. Therefore, she could not seek damages for defamation or 
protection from the hostile gossip of the town. For good measure he added: 
“This Court having considered this case in its entirety has found as a fact that 
the plaintiff sued the wrong people.” She should have sued the children. 
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 The outcome of the trial was that the witch, though not officially con-
victed as such, was in effect banished. Mrs. K. never returned to work at the 
hospital. She sought, and was granted, a transfer to a clinic in her home 
village where her husband owned a shop. She had wanted her day in court, 
in a “fair forum where the issue could be settled,” and this was not accom-
plished. When she was interviewed by my assistant (Oct. 30, 2009), she 
attributed her failure in court to corruption, claiming that an officer of the 
court had offered to swing the case her way for a fee of MK10,000 (about 
U.S.$100). “My heart pains me every day,” she told my assistant when he 
met with her some months later. “A day does not pass without me thinking 
of this story. God will be my magistrate.” 
 Truth and Justice in a World of Witches: The Problem of Proof 
 At the heart of Magistrate Banda’s judgments is a distinction between being 
and acting, between the witch as a particular kind of being and “practicing 
witchcraft” as a distinct form of action. Both Mrs. K. and the elder Mr. Kasito 
were found by the magistrate to probably be witches. In neither case, how-
ever, was there sufficient proof that they were guilty of practicing witchcraft 
in the specific form of teaching children. The distinction Magistrate Banda 
deployed in his judgments resonates with common usage in discourse per-
taining to witchcraft in Malawi as in most other places where people live in 
a world with witches. In the Malawi vernacular of Chichewa, for example, 
 mfiti refers to a particular kind of person—human, superhuman, and sub-
human at the same time—inhabiting a particular mode of being. This is the 
witch, or sometimes “wizard” (when the speaker takes pains to establish 
gender), distinguished by virtue of belonging to a different category of 
being from otherwise ordinary humans. The key to this mode of being is 
the ability to operate within a space ordinary persons experience as the 
domain of dreams.  Matsenga , on the other hand, refers to witchcraft as 
a mode of action perpetrated by an ordinary kind of person who does 
not necessarily possess the forms of personhood indicative of the mfiti. 
Anthropology knows this as the distinction between the witch and the sor-
cerer (see Evans-Pritchard  1937 ), though this is misleading as it emphasizes 
a distinction between two different modes of action rather than between 
acting and being. 
 As a form of action, matsenga witchcraft is typically said to derive from 
specialized knowledge of the powers inherent in material substances. In 
principle, anyone—at least, any adult—can practice this form of witchcraft; 
children are generally not said to be involved. All one needs is the knowledge 
and the material, variously known as  mankhwala , charms, herbs, medicines, 
or  muti , which are presumed to be purchasable from specialists. Herbalists 
ply their wares openly in markets and on the side of the road outside hospi-
tals. For the most part they are presumed to be in the business of healing, 
though there is always suspicion about whether the knowledge involved in 
healing may also be deployed for more nefarious purposes. 
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 Nobody publicly proclaims any involvement in the trade of witchcraft 
substances, although no one doubts that the trade is widespread. The puta-
tive knowledge underlying matsenga (as well as cognate forms of sorcery 
across the continent) is often referred to as “African science,” which is pre-
sumed to be the inverse of the healing “science” practiced by traditional 
healers. Without getting too involved in an exposition of systems of belief, 
however, we should note that it is equally plausible to suppose that Satan 
imparts witchcraft knowledge to his followers, or that “traditional” practices 
are really demonic manifestations, as many African Christians readily 
assert. 
 Stories about matsenga typically revolve around a perpetrator motivated 
by jealousy and hatred to harm a victim known to him or her personally. 
They are stories of murder and attempted murder, of violence perpetrated 
on victims by their enemies. Perpetrators are typically in relatively close 
proximity to, if not intimacy with, the victims—typically relatives, neigh-
bors, coworkers, and schoolmates. Victims of this kind of mystical violence 
get sick, die, suffer accidents, lose jobs, or experience one of the other 
misfortunes that we humans wish upon each other in the daily course of 
living together. A perpetrator of this kind of witchcraft has not necessarily 
gone completely over to the dark side, so to speak. He or she might use 
charms to kill a neighbor who has provoked feelings of jealousy while 
remaining a valued coworker, a loving father, and an otherwise upstanding 
citizen. 
 The mfiti witch, on the other hand, is addicted to evil and abominable 
practices. To be an mfiti is to be a particular kind of man or woman. The 
mfiti kills for the love of killing, or to sate a lust for feasting on human flesh. 
He or she kills to repay commensal gifts of the flesh of other witches’ kin. 
These witches want to bring misery and death to others simply because they 
can. The mfiti has extraordinary powers, capable of amazing feats like flying 
through the night on a witchcraft airplane while leaving a physical body 
asleep in bed at home. These witches enjoy the company of fellow witches 
and seek to convert others to their vile practices, including their abominable 
sexual predilections, picking on children since they are least able to resist. 
The mfiti, in this way, occupies a distinct status and represents a particular 
mode of being: at once human and not human, both superhuman and sub-
human. Yet—and this point is crucial for the attribution of criminality—a 
person might be a witch and yet not be practicing witchcraft, or even know 
she is such a creature. The mfiti, then, is not the sort of being to which 
the notion of “human rights” applies without a considerable degree of 
ambiguity. 
 If establishing that a person is—or at least is generally considered to 
be—a witch is relatively straightforward, proving that a particular misfor-
tune is the result of such nefarious actions is another matter. So, how might 
the truth of accusations regarding the practice of witchcraft be proved? 
From observations of Magistrate Banda’s court, as well as others, proof of the 
practice of witchcraft would seem to have some of the following elements. 
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 First, since witchcraft is not a victimless crime, proof of witchcraft 
requires testimony or a complaint by, or on behalf of, a victim or victims. In 
the first case above, for example, Masautso Kasito, who lodged the com-
plaint with the police about witchcraft in his family, was suffering pains the 
herbalist had told him were caused by witchcraft. His brother, the same 
healer told him, had been killed by witchcraft. Young children in his family 
were telling of being taught witchcraft. There were plenty of victims, past, 
present, and future. Witchcraft is generally detected retrospectively. Once 
misfortune strikes, the questions, classically framed by Evans-Pritchard, 
arise: Why me? Why now? When these are posed in a context in which 
witchcraft is a viable hypothesis, the possibility of occult assault must be 
considered. 
 The existence of a victim who has suffered harm, while a necessary 
condition for a witchcraft narrative to be framed, does not, in and of 
itself, constitute proof. When the witchcraft hypothesis is presented, the 
next question is: who is the likely perpetrator? Since witchcraft is rarely 
the work of strangers, the usual suspects readily emerge: enter the 
elderly Mr. Kasito. But even the suffering of the victim and the existence 
of a likely suspect are not sufficient for the matter to rise above the level 
of mere quarrel to enter the domain of crime. Whether or not the suspi-
cion of witchcraft is confirmed by the actions of a witch will depend on 
the evidence. 
 Although witchcraft is practiced in secret, there can, in theory, be direct 
evidence of its use. Suspicious substances may be found in places where 
they don’t belong. Unusual behavior, such as tiredness in the morning 
(which could be interpreted as resulting from flying at night), or loss of 
appetite (from eating human flesh), or being caught naked after dark in a 
neighbor’s yard (which could be taken as resulting from the crash of a 
witchcraft airplane) are all, in principle, open to verification, though the 
interpretations might be contestable. From time to time people engaged in 
a quarrel have been known to utter threats of occult violence, the standard 
wording of which is “you shall see.” Such a threat, publically witnessed, fol-
lowed by untoward events among those subject to it, would be an obvious 
clue. Since jealousy, anger, and hatred are considered the primary motives 
for perpetrating harm by means of witchcraft, a history of enmity and 
quarrel between individuals or families could be quarried for traces of mali-
cious motives. In close-knit communities where people live with witches, 
moreover, everybody comes to know who they are. Over time, gossip, ru-
mors, suspicions, and accusations accumulate so that when misfortune 
strikes, there is rarely any difficulty in identifying the suspects (Ashforth 
 2005 ; Elias  1956 ; Stewart & Strathern  2004 ). Proving that the person sus-
pected of witchcraft actually performed the deed, however, is tricky. As 
Magistrate Banda insists time and again in his court, mere testimony, or 
“belief,” is not sufficient proof in court. And the testimony of children, 
though necessary in cases such as those discussed above, is inherently prob-
lematic and never sufficient. 
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 Although the means by which witches act are invisible to ordinary mor-
tals, healers are generally considered to have special abilities to perceive the 
actions of witchcraft. Healers’ claims, however, are eminently contestable. 
While almost everyone accepts the general possibility of healers being able 
to see the unseen, every particular claim is open to question. Testimony by 
one healer, moreover, can be undermined by that of another. Since suspi-
cions and accusations of witchcraft typically arise within intimate social 
networks (Geschiere  2013 ), most people agree that “objectivity” in the evi-
dence of ritual specialists is secured by recruiting a healer from far outside 
the circle of familiarity with any particular case. Greater confidence in the 
testimony of healers also arises from concordance among the readings of 
several unrelated healers. In the case of the Kasito family, while no healers 
testified in court, several witnesses gave reports of the results of divination. 
These reports were given considerable weight by Magistrate Banda in exon-
erating the second defendant, Annie. In his jurisprudence, however, the 
testimony of a healer alone would be insufficient to convict a person 
accused of witchcraft unless the evidence was independently corroborated. 
 Ensuring the truth of testimony is a challenge in all jurisdictions, and 
courts frequently resort to supernatural sanctions for support. In many 
parts of Africa “ritual” oaths, in which individuals attest to their honesty at 
the risk of punishment from supernatural beings, either upon their own 
persons or those of their families and clans, have often been used as a proof 
of honesty and have been accorded centrality in judicial practice (Kirk-
Greene  1955 ). I have not encountered such oaths in accounts of hearings 
in Malawian Chiefs’ Courts, however, and Gluckman ( 1955 ), in his classic 
study of Barotse law in the 1940s in neighboring Zambia, remarked on the 
absence of oaths or other supernatural sanctions underpinning claims to 
the veracity of testimony in courts. Nor is oath-taking a major feature of 
truth-speaking in the South African context, although early Zulu ethnogra-
phies do point to forms of invoking the ancestors as a way of authorizing 
the veracity of speech (Bryant  1949 ). In the Magistrate’s Court, however, 
oaths are administered on the Bible, and in Africa as elsewhere such a 
pledge engages a person in a potentially dangerous relationship with a 
supernatural being who will dispense punishment if the truth is not told. In 
the case of the Kasito family, two of the children were ruled incapable of 
taking oaths because they were too young to “know God,” although even if 
they had been judged capable of testifying under oath, their testimony 
would have required corroboration by others before the magistrate would 
have considered it proof. 
 Perhaps the most effective proof of innocence or guilt in matters of 
witchcraft is the suspected witch’s response to a trial by ordeal of the sort 
that Bartret Kasito claimed he had undergone. Ordeals were widespread in 
this part of the world before being banned by colonial law (Chanock  1985 ), 
though evidently the ban, still in effect, is less than comprehensive, if the 
elder Kasito is to be believed. In medieval Europe ordeals involved the 
grasping of a red-hot iron or the dunking of the suspect in a pool of water; 
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burning or drowning was taken as a sign from God of the suspect’s guilt 
(Pollock & Maitland  1911 ). In African ordeals, similarly, ritual experts 
administer a special substance to the accused, whose consequent death or 
survival signifies the unquestionable judgment of relevant spiritual beings 
(Douglas,  1963 ; Marwick & Middleton  1967 ). 
 The beauty of the ordeal in relation to witchcraft is that it both decides 
the truth and executes punishment in one move. Suspects who survive, 
moreover, are restored from the social death that often befalls suspected 
witches and they can be reintegrated into the community. Colonial author-
ities worked hard to outlaw such ordeals, succeeding in reducing their prev-
alence and public scale by subjecting those responsible for them to charges 
of manslaughter (Chanock  1985 ). While the experience of Bartret Kasito 
suggests that ordeals are not quite things of the past, the fact that they are 
illegal under the terms of the Witchcraft Act, along with the fear of result-
ing murder charges in the event of the suspect’s death, must surely restrain 
healers who would administer them. Nonetheless, the ordeal, along with 
confession, remains a touchstone of objective proof of witchcraft, from the 
point of view of those who live in the world with witches. Yet even ordeals 
are open to doubt. As the experience of Bartret Kasito shows, what seemed 
to him to be a clear-cut ordeal was portrayed in the testimony of one of his 
sons as a form of cleansing ritual, a way of removing and neutralizing witch-
craft, and Magistrate Banda made it clear that the evidence of ordeals had 
no place in his court. The fact that the old man survived an ordeal was 
noted, but it was not considered relevant. 
 Finally, and most important, proof of witchcraft, as we have seen, is 
obtained legally only with the confession of the accused witch to having 
practiced witchcraft. Because of the secrecy enshrouding witchcraft, in the 
absence of confession, doubt as to a suspect’s guilt can always be raised. Even 
the great fifteenth-century manual of the Inquisition,  Malleus Maleficarum , 
noted that a witch should not be put to death before she confesses (Institoris, 
Sprenger, & Summers,  1928 [1489]), even if that confession had to be 
obtained through torture. Confession thus remains the ultimate proof of 
witchcraft, although few witches willingly confess unless they can be confi-
dent of forgiveness. For this reason, most witchcraft confessions in contempo-
rary Africa take place in the relative safety of Christian church congregations, 
where they thrive because renunciation of a former evil life can add credence 
to claims of deliverance and salvation. In the cases described above, the 
imperative of confession for the proof of the witch’s identity is underlined by 
the fact that Section 6 of the Witchcraft Act outlaws “pretending” to the 
powers of witchcraft, thus requiring confession in order to secure conviction. 
To repeat Magistrate Banda’s argument: to say “I am a witch” is a crime, not 
because being a witch is a crime, but because saying so is. 
 Yet even though confession serves as the ultimate touchstone for truth 
in relation to witchcraft, confessions in witchcraft cases—as in others, for that 
matter—are notoriously unreliable (Kassin  2008 ; Kassin & Wrightsman  1985 ). 
Even when not extracted under torture, seemingly voluntary confessions 
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can be false; in initiatives undertaken by the U.S. Innocence Project, for 
example, false confessions were shown to play a role in some 25 percent of 
cases in which individuals eventually were exonerated with the use of DNA 
evidence (Innocence Project  2013 ). In addition to the reasons that suspects 
in ordinary criminal cases might confess to crimes they did not commit, 
witchcraft confessions have two other dimensions of complexity. First, given 
that witchcraft activities take place in a domain not accessible to ordinary 
consciousness, a person might, in principle, possess occult powers unknow-
ingly and commit acts of witchcraft without being aware of such activities. 
Second, as the sad case of Mrs. K. demonstrates, it is impossible to prove 
that one is not a witch. A timely confession, in the hopes of leniency, is thus 
the optimal strategy for an accused witch, regardless of the truth of the 
accusation. 
 Conclusion: The Witch Trial as Restorative Justice 
 The human rights approach to witchcraft accusations denies their validity 
and forecloses the possibility of a trial, fair or otherwise. While there is 
much to be said for a bracing rationalism in all aspects of life, evidence 
from Africa over the past couple of centuries shows no sign that witchcraft 
narratives lose their plausibility as a result of people being told that witches 
do not exist. Rather than insisting that such accusations are, by definition, 
baseless, a better approach is the one exemplified by Magistrate Banda: 
hearing the evidence and deciding the case on its merits. By making the 
distinction between the person of the witch and the action of witchcraft, 
moreover, the magistrate was able to identify possible sources of perceived 
danger for the community while insisting on a high standard of proof in 
relation to judgments of crime.  20  
 In this, the magistrate is not alone, for there is a widespread commit-
ment in Africa to the need for evidence in relation to witchcraft accusa-
tions, both among authorities and the public more generally. And while it 
is relatively easy to identify a perceived witch simply by adjudicating the 
plausibility of narratives relating to a person’s identity, it is much more dif-
ficult to use evidence to prove the actuality and efficacy of purported occult 
actions. Indeed, the growing literature in forensic psychology relating to the 
testimony of children and the phenomenon of false confession increases 
our understanding of the difficulty of arriving at definitive proof in such 
cases. 
 In practice, when a magistrate hears a witchcraft case with a view to 
judging the evidence, he is allowing all concerned to tell their stories in 
ways that facilitate the airing of grievances and dissipation of anger without 
causing serious harm to the accused, bringing about, in the process, a ver-
sion of the restorative justice for which African jurisprudence is celebrated. 
Contrary to the blanket application of the universal principle of “human 
rights”—under which any accusation of witchcraft must always be presumed 
false—Magistrate Banda applied a form of casuistry in which each case is 
 30  African Studies Review
considered on its merits, evidence is weighed, and precedents are consid-
ered (Jonsen & Toulmin  1988 ). If witches were accorded the right to a fair 
trial of the sort Magistrate Banda conducts—in which the evidence is pre-
sented in open court and the verdict is based on reasoning from law and 
precedent—the accused would have a measure of protection from violent 
mob justice, as would the community from the fear of witchcraft. Like chiefs 
adjudicating witchcraft cases in customary justice forums, Magistrate Banda 
was less concerned with imposing punishment than with achieving a sense 
of security and justice, if not harmony, in the community. As he told me in 
our 2013 interview, he has a duty as a magistrate to “advise” or to “give 
advice” from his position on the bench, not merely to impose the “techni-
calities” of the law. 
 The concept of advice generally has a much greater weight in African 
contexts than it has in contemporary Western usage, more akin to the 
obligatory “advise and consent” clauses of various national constitutions 
than the optional take-it-or-leave-it character of the “advice columnist.” 
Parents, relatives, siblings, and friends, among others, all have obligations 
to give advice in particular contexts, often with quite formal rules estab-
lishing who can speak on what, how, and when. For example, in the 
Malawian context, marriage counselors known as  Ankhoswe —in this 
region, usually maternal uncles of the husband and wife—after advising 
on the suitability of the union prior to marriage, are charged with giving 
advice in the event of marital discord. Failure to heed advice, similarly, 
is classed as a much more weighty infraction of societal norms than the 
mere choosing of a different option. It is usually construed not only as the 
deliberate choosing of the wrong path, the road to immorality, but also a 
souring, if not rejection, of the proper relationship that ought to subsist 
between the advisor and advisee, and thus their larger community. By 
patiently listening to the details of complex conflicts and then weighing 
the evidence of culpability and blame, Magistrate Banda gave advice that 
brought about justice. 
 Magistrate Banda’s court provides a good example of a situation that 
I suspect is quite common across Africa when courts are confronted with 
witchcraft cases.  21  African courts since independence have been dealing 
with issues of concern to local people that are inadequately dealt with in 
legislation, notably in relation to marriage and inheritance but also in 
cases pertaining to witchcraft (Van Gijsegem  2008 ; Veitch  1971 ). Since 
refusing to hear such cases would be impolitic, and since principles of 
legal evidence make conviction difficult, Magistrate Banda in effect con-
ducts two trials simultaneously. The formal trial adheres to the letter of 
the law; the verdict is recorded accordingly with the possibility of appeal 
explained to all parties. The informal trial does not contravene the law, 
but enshrines somewhat different principles of truth and justice, such as 
those outlined above. 
 Drawing on his legal status as magistrate, Damson Banda uses his 
authority to resolve witchcraft cases by carefully considering the evidence 
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and assigning guilt, albeit not in a formal appealable verdict but rather in 
a personal opinion delivered from the bench with all the weight of the 
magistrate’s voice. In this way he uses his authority to resolve the real case, 
and he uses the case to bolster his authority, his ability to speak the truth 
from the bench. From the perspective of the new anti-anti-witchcraft activ-
ists, these informal witch trials are perpetrating an injustice on people such 
as Mrs. K. or Masautso Kasito. From the perspective of the community, how-
ever, justice is served. Just as important, perhaps, the need for violence is 
averted. 
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 Notes 
  1.  For example, the Stop Child Witch Accusations committee. See  http://stop-
cwa.org . 
  2.  For example, the South African Pagan Rights Alliance’s “30 Days of Advocacy 
Against Witch-Hunts in Africa” campaigns. 
  3.  In 2013, for example, the Norwegian government granted the Association of 
Secular Humanists of Malawi a sum of about U.S.$500,000 to educate people 
on the provisions of the colonial era Witchcraft Act (Massina  2013 ). 
  4.  In 2004 the United Nations High Commission on Refugees issued guidelines 
on international protection for religion-based claims that included witchcraft, 
specifically relating to women: “Women are still identified as ‘witches’ in some 
communities and burned or stoned to death. These practices may be culturally 
condoned in the claimant’s community of origin but still amount to persecu-
tion” (UNHCR  2004 ). 
  5.  This is a key claim of the South African Pagan Rights Alliance (SAPRA), which 
advocates on behalf of practitioners of “pagan” religions such as Wicca. SAPRA 
has succeeded in pressuring the South Africa Law Reform Commission to take 
up the issue of reforming the Suppression of Witchcraft Act on the grounds that 
it contravenes their rights to freedom of religion. In Malawi, a long-delayed 
case before the High Court has been brought on similar grounds. 
  6.  For a good survey of the global history and anthropology of witchcraft and 
witch-hunting, see Ellis ( 2007 ); Behringer ( 2004 ). 
  7.  For a critique of the use of the concept of “belief” in the social sciences, 
see Witchcraft Accusation and Persecution that is advocated by the Ashforth 
( 2011 ); Good ( 1994 ); Needham ( 1972 ); W. C. Smith ( 1977 ). 
  8.  The new acronym, WAP, which is advocated by the Witchcraft and Human 
Rights Information Network (WHIRN 2013), represents an attempt to overcome 
this terminological confusion. 
  9.  In a valuable paper seeking to dial back some of the hysteria his earlier work 
on child witches in Kinshasa had aroused, Flip de Boek ( 2009 ) makes the point 
that even children are capable on occasion of manipulating to their own advan-
tage the idea that they should be feared as witches. 
 10.  Compare this with the number of homicides, which, if the WHO rate of 36 per 
100,000 is to be believed (which is doubtful, given the state of the records), 
would equal 5,760 per year. 
 11.  Using local rainfall variation, Miguel’s paper identifies the impact of income 
shocks on witch killings in rural Tanzania and shows how such killings occur 
at twice the rate in years of extreme rainfall and famine. While the results are 
persuasive, Miguel’s explanations are suspect, largely because he neglected 
to examine the impact of famine on mortality. Rather than witches being 
killed to free up scarce resources, as Miguel hypothesizes, it is more likely 
that food scarcity increased mortality, particularly among infants, nursing 
mothers, pregnant women, and AIDS patients in ways that would be consid-
ered untimely and therefore highly suggestive of witchcraft. Witch killings, 
then, would be expected to rise during times of famine because more people 
would be motivated to impose punishment or exact revenge on suspected 
witches during a time of heightened insecurity. The increase in mortality would 
also mean that restraining factors, such as arguments in favor of alternative 
methods of protecting against witchcraft (e.g., prayer or traditional healing), 
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would also seem to be losing efficacy, thereby making death of the witch, the 
last resort, more likely. 
 12.  The discussion of these cases is drawn from my forthcoming book,  The Trials 
of Mrs. K. and Other Stories of Witchcraft, Justice, And Human Rights in Africa 
(University of Chicago Press). The analysis is based on direct observation in 
the courtroom, interviews with participants, and a close reading of the texts 
of Magistrate Banda’s judgments, which my assistant obtained from the office 
of the court. These documents are the texts that were read to the court by 
the magistrate when passing judgment in the cases. They are public docu-
ments, from public trials. Such documents are not easily obtained, however, as 
they are usually handwritten by the magistrates and only rarely typed, mostly 
when a case is appealed to the High Court. We were able to obtain these by 
paying for the typing to be done. At least, that is what we were told we were 
paying for. 
 13.  For a discussion of the poison ordeal among people of Bartret Kasito’s ethnic 
group, the Yao, see Dicks ( 2013 ). For more on ordeals in this part of the world 
(which were banned under the Witchcraft Act, and which the anthropological 
literature of mid-century reported as things of the past), see Douglas ( 1963 ) 
and Marwick ( 1965 ). In his 1923 book about the Kaonde people of northwest-
ern Zambia, where he worked as a district commissioner for twenty-one years, 
Frank Melland ( 1923 ) includes a photograph of a sad character sitting on a 
bench being given a pot of “mwabfi” to drink. 
 14.  I have been unable to locate this  Guide , but assume it is a local version of 
the “Practice Direction” issued by the Chief Justice of England, Lord Parker, 
in 1962 regarding procedures for courts to follow when deciding whether 
there is a case to be answered. See Practice Direction (Submission of no 
case) [1962] 1 WLR 227; [1962] 1 All ER 448, DC; 9/2/62 (United Kingdom, 
2013). 
 15.  The difference between “having the power of witchcraft,” and “having the 
power of exercising witchcraft” is not apparent to me—unless  exercising is a 
typographical error and the word should have been  exorcising . 
 16.  Although, when I interviewed Magistrate Banda in 2013 about this case and 
asked whether such a “confession” in the context of cleansing would suffice as 
evidence under S.6, he said it would not, since it would indicate the accused 
had repented and put witchcraft behind him. 
 17.  The magistrate’s case for circumspection in hearing the testimony of children 
could be bolstered by consideration of the recent psychological literature in 
a field that has developed greatly since the infamous McMartin preschool 
Satanic child-abuse case in Los Angeles and the moral panic it spawned in the 
U.S. and elsewhere throughout the 1980s. For a review of this literature see 
Ceci and Bruck ( 2006 ); Mart ( 2010 ); Principe et al. ( 2010 ). 
 18.  This part of the Act is rarely enforced. The Association of Secular Human-
ists, funded by the Norwegian government, has been campaigning to raise 
awareness among police officers, court officials, and traditional leaders of 
the prohibitions on making witchcraft accusations. When diagnosing cases 
of witchcraft, traditional healers typically do not name specific perpetrators 
but rather promise to deal with them using their spiritual and medicinal 
powers. This is less to avoid legal liability than to avoid being held respon-
sible for conflict that might occur were the witchcraft victim to take action 
against the witch. 
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 19.  For insight into the editorial politics of this program and the ways witchcraft 
stories feature in these broadcasts, see Englund ( 2007 ,  2011 ). 
 20.  It should be noted here that the history of the law of evidence in the Common 
Law tradition derives in large part from the experience of witch trials in seven-
teenth century England. See Darr ( 2011 ). 
 21.  A 2009 study of “witchcraft crime” in the Mpondoland region of South Africa, 
for example, found that traditional leaders were deeply committed to consider-
ing evidence when cases of purported witchcraft were brought to them. More-
over, the same study found that most such cases were brought by the person 
accused of being a witch and were resolved in favor of the accused, usually 
because of problems of proof. See Petrus ( 2009 ). 
